GOST - Revision history

Fmendel: /* Best Known Results */

2008-11-10T10:03:19Z

‎Best Known Results

Fmendel: /* Cryptanalysis */

2008-11-10T10:02:48Z

‎Cryptanalysis

Fmendel: /* Others */

2008-11-10T09:59:49Z

‎Others

Fmendel: /* Collision Attacks */

2008-11-10T09:34:12Z

‎Collision Attacks

Fmendel: /* Preimage Attacks */

2008-11-10T09:31:50Z

‎Preimage Attacks

Fmendel at 07:31, 10 November 2008

2008-11-10T07:31:18Z

Fmendel at 07:15, 11 March 2008

2008-03-11T07:15:39Z

Tnad: /* General */

2008-03-10T15:00:16Z

‎General

Crechberger at 13:19, 7 March 2008

2008-03-07T13:19:56Z

New page

== General ==



== Cryptanalysis ==

=== Best Known Results ===

----

=== Generic Attacks ===
* [[GenericAttacksMerkleDamgaard| Generic Attacks on the Merkle-Damgaard Construction ]]

----

=== Collision Attacks ===

----

=== Second Preimage Attacks ===

----

=== Preimage Attacks ===

----

=== Others ===

== Performance Evaluation / Implementation (HW and SW) ==

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 === Best Known Results ===
-The best collision attack on GOST was published by Mendel et al. It has complexity of 2<sup>105</sup> compression function evaluations. The best second preimage and preimage attack has complexity of 2<sup>192</sup> compression function evaluations.
+The best collision attack on GOST was published by Mendel et al. It has complexity of 2<sup>105</sup> compression function evaluations. The best preimage and second preimage attack has complexity of 2<sup>192</sup> compression function evaluations.
 ----

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:02, 10 November 2008
Line 14:		Line 14:
	=== Best Known Results ===		=== Best Known Results ===

		+	The best collision attack on GOST was published by Mendel et al. It has complexity of 2<sup>105</sup> compression function evaluations. The best second preimage and preimage attack has complexity of 2<sup>192</sup> compression function evaluations.
	----		----

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:59, 10 November 2008
Line 68:		Line 68:

	=== Others ===		=== Others ===
		+
		+	<bibtex>
		+	@inproceedings{ctrsaGauravaramK08,
		+	author = {Praveen Gauravaram and John Kelsey},
		+	title = {Linear-XOR and Additive Checksums Don't Protect Damg{\aa}rd-Merkle Hashes from Generic Attacks},
		+	booktitle = {CT-RSA},
		+	year = {2008},
		+	pages = {36-51},
		+	abstract = {We consider the security of Damgaard-Merkle variants which compute linear-XOR or additive checksums over message blocks, intermediate hash values, or both, and process these checksums in computing the final hash value. We show that these Damgård-Merkle variants gain almost no security against generic attacks such as the long-message second preimage attacks of [10,21] and the herding attack of [9].},
		+	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_3},
		+	editor = {Tal Malkin},
		+	publisher = {Springer},
		+	series = {LNCS},
		+	volume = {4964},
		+	isbn = {978-3-540-79262-8},
		+	}
		+	</bibtex>

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:34, 10 November 2008
Line 22:		Line 22:

	=== Collision Attacks ===		=== Collision Attacks ===
		+
		+	<bibtex>
		+	@inproceedings{cryptoMendelPRKS08,
		+	author = {Florian Mendel and Norbert Pramstaller and Christian Rechberger and Marcin Kontak and Janusz Szmidt},
		+	title = {Cryptanalysis of the GOST Hash Function},
		+	booktitle = {CRYPTO},
		+	year = {2008},
		+	pages = {162-178},
		+	abstract = {In this article, we analyze the security of the GOST hash function. The GOST hash function, defined in the Russian standard GOST 34.11-94, is an iterated hash function producing a 256-bit hash value. As opposed to most commonly used hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1, the GOST hash function defines, in addition to the common iterative structure, a checksum computed over all input message blocks. This checksum is then part of the final hash value computation. As a result of our security analysis of the GOST hash function, we present the first collision attack with a complexity of about 2^105 evaluations of the compression function. Furthermore, we are able to significantly improve upon the results of Mendel et al. with respect to preimage and second preimage attacks. Our improved attacks have a complexity of about 2^192 evaluations of the compression function. },
		+	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_10},
		+	editor = {David Wagner},
		+	publisher = {Springer},
		+	series = {LNCS},
		+	volume = {5157},
		+	isbn = {978-3-540-85173-8},
		+	}
		+	</bibtex>

	----		----

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:15, 11 March 2008
Line 34:		Line 34:

	=== Others ===		=== Others ===
−
−
−	~~== Performance Evaluation / Implementation (HW and SW) ==~~

@@ Line 31: / Line 31: @@
 === Preimage Attacks ===
 ----
 === Others ===

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 == Specification ==
 <!--
 * max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits
-* compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable
+-->
 * Specification:
--->
 == Cryptanalysis ==

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:00, 10 March 2008
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	== ~~General~~ ==	+	== Specification ==

	<!--		<!--