HAS-V - Revision history

Fmendel: /* Best Known Results */

2008-11-10T10:49:24Z

‎Best Known Results

Fmendel: /* Others */

2008-03-11T13:10:53Z

‎Others

Npramstaller: /* Specification */

2008-03-11T06:02:30Z

‎Specification

Npramstaller: /* Specification */

2008-03-11T06:01:50Z

‎Specification

Npramstaller: /* Specification */

2008-03-11T05:47:39Z

‎Specification

Npramstaller: /* Specification */

2008-03-11T05:42:23Z

‎Specification

Npramstaller: /* Specification */

2008-03-11T05:42:04Z

‎Specification

Npramstaller at 05:41, 11 March 2008

2008-03-11T05:41:20Z

New page

== Specification ==



== Cryptanalysis ==

=== Best Known Results ===

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=== Generic Attacks ===
* [[GenericAttacksMerkleDamgaard| Generic Attacks on the Merkle-Damgaard Construction ]]

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=== Collision Attacks ===

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=== Second Preimage Attacks ===

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=== Preimage Attacks ===

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=== Others ===

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 === Best Known Results ===
+Mendel and Rijmen show weaknesses in the compression function of HAS-V. They present pseudo-collisions for HAS-V for all output sizes. Furthermore, they show a preimage and second preimage attack on HAS-V (with output size >160) with complexity of about 2<sup>162</sup> compression function evaluations.
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← Older revision		Revision as of 13:10, 11 March 2008
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	=== Others ===		=== Others ===
		+	<bibtex>
		+	@inproceedings{iciscMendelR07a,
		+	author = {Florian Mendel and Vincent Rijmen},
		+	title = {Weaknesses in the HAS-V Compression Function},
		+	booktitle = {ICISC},
		+	year = {2007},
		+	pages = {335-345},
		+	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_27},
		+	editor = {Kil-Hyun Nam and Gwangsoo Rhee},
		+	publisher = {Springer},
		+	series = {LNCS},
		+	volume = {4817},
		+	isbn = {978-3-540-76787-9},
		+	abstract = {HAS-V is a cryptographic hash function which processes 1024-bit message blocks and produces a hash value of variable length. The design of the hash function is based on design principles of the MD4 family. Recently, weaknesses have been shown in members of this family. Therefore, the analysis of the HAS-V hash function is of great interest. To the best of our knowledge this is the first article that investigates the security of the HAS-V hash function. In this article, we point out several structural weaknesses in HAS-V which lead to pseudo-collision attacks on HAS-V with tailored output. Furthermore, we show that (second) preimages can be found for HAS-V with a complexity of about 2^{162} hash computations.},
		+	}
		+	</bibtex>

@@ Line 21: / Line 21: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
 == Cryptanalysis ==

@@ Line 21: / Line 21: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
 == Cryptanalysis ==

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 == Specification ==
-* digest size: 160 bits
+* digest size: 128 - 320 bits
 * max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits
-* compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable
+* compression function: 1024-bit message block, 320-bit chaining variable
 * Specification:
 <bibtex>