NaSHA - Revision history

JAumasson: BibTeX fix

2009-02-23T13:48:47Z

BibTeX fix

JAumasson: New document on NaSHA added

2009-02-23T13:30:09Z

New document on NaSHA added

SThomsen at 08:18, 18 February 2009

2009-02-18T08:18:52Z

SThomsen: Memory requirements for the 2^128 collision attack are negligible (according to authors)

2009-01-15T10:00:06Z

Memory requirements for the 2^128 collision attack are negligible (according to authors)

Fmendel: Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512

2009-01-14T09:58:36Z

Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512

Fmendel at 20:02, 29 December 2008

2008-12-29T20:02:43Z

Fmendel: /* Cryptanalysis */

2008-12-16T14:17:45Z

‎Cryptanalysis

Fmendel: Collision attack on NaSHA-512

2008-12-16T14:17:27Z

Collision attack on NaSHA-512

Fmendel: /* The algorithm */

2008-12-11T09:25:56Z

‎The algorithm

Fmendel: /* Cryptanalysis */

2008-12-03T11:55:16Z

‎Cryptanalysis

@@ Line 82: / Line 82: @@
 <bibtex>
 @misc{MarkovskiMDG-eprint:2009:034,
-  author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and V. Dimitrova and Danilo Gligoroski},
+  author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and Vesna Dimitrova and Danilo Gligoroski},
   title  = {On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512},
   howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/034},
@@ Line 93: / Line 93: @@
 <bibtex>
 @misc{MDD09,
-  author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and V. Dimitrova},
+  author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and Vesna Dimitrova},
   title  = {On the Second Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512},
   howpublished = {Available online},

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 * Author(s): Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva
-* Website: [http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/Nasha.htm http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/Nasha.htm]
+* Website: [http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/nasha_hf.html http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/nasha_hf.html]
 * NIST submission package: [http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/Round1/documents/NaSHA.zip NaSHA.zip]
@@ Line 82: / Line 82: @@
 <bibtex>
 @misc{MarkovskiMDG-eprint:2009:034,
-  author = {S. Markovski and A. Mileva and V. Dimitrova and D. Gligoroski},
+  author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and V. Dimitrova and Danilo Gligoroski},
   title  = {On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512},
   howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/034},
@@ Line 88: / Line 88: @@
   url    = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034.pdf},
   abstract = {A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.}
+}
 </bibtex>

@@ Line 76: / Line 76: @@
      year = {2009},
      url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf},
-     abstract = { In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$).},
+     abstract = {In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$).},
+}
 </bibtex>

@@ Line 33: / Line 33: @@
 |  style="background:yellow" | collision || hash || 512 ||  || 2<sup>192</sup> || ? || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/519.pdf Ji,Liangyu,Xu]
 |-
-|  style="background:yellow" | collision || hash || 384,512 ||  || 2<sup>128</sup> || ? || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf Z. Li, D. Li]
+|  style="background:orange" | collision || hash || 384,512 ||  || 2<sup>128</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf Z. Li, D. Li]
 |-
 |}

@@ Line 32: / Line 32: @@
 |-
 |  style="background:yellow" | collision || hash || 512 ||  || 2<sup>192</sup> || ? || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/519.pdf Ji,Liangyu,Xu]
 |-
 |}
@@ Line 47: / Line 49: @@
    abstract = {We present a free-start collision and a free-start preimage
 attack on NaSHA. The attacks exploit the fact that when the state, obtained
-after the linear transformation, is only partially �xed then the
+after the linear transformation, is only partially fixed then the
 quasigroup operations are fully determined. The free-start collision attack
 requires $2^{32}$ computations for all digests. The free-start preimage
@@ Line 64: / Line 66: @@
      url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/519.pdf},
      abstract = {The hash function NaSHA is a new algorithm proposed for SHA-3. It follows the wide-pipe structure and compression function adopts quasigroup transformations. These properties of operation in quasigroup raise obstacles to analysis. However, The high probability difference to cause inner collision can be found in the quasigroup transformations. We propose a collision attack to NaSHA-512 with the complexity is 2^{192}, which is lower than the complexity of birthday attack to NaSHA-512. Using the similar method, we can find free-start collision on all versions with negligible complexity.},
+}
 </bibtex>

@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 </bibtex>
+<bibtex>
 @misc{cryptoeprint:2008:519,
      author = {Li Ji and Xu Liangyu and Guan Xu},
@@ Line 46: / Line 46: @@
      abstract = {The hash function NaSHA is a new algorithm proposed for SHA-3. It follows the wide-pipe structure and compression function adopts quasigroup transformations. These properties of operation in quasigroup raise obstacles to analysis. However, The high probability difference to cause inner collision can be found in the quasigroup transformations. We propose a collision attack to NaSHA-512 with the complexity is 2^{192}, which is lower than the complexity of birthday attack to NaSHA-512. Using the similar method, we can find free-start collision on all versions with negligible complexity.},
+}

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:17, 16 December 2008
Line 36:		Line 36:
	}		}
	</bibtex>		</bibtex>
		+
		+
		+	@misc{cryptoeprint:2008:519,
		+	author = {Li Ji and Xu Liangyu and Guan Xu},
		+	title = {Collision attack on NaSHA-512},
		+	howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/519},
		+	year = {2008},
		+	url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/519.pdf},
		+	abstract = {The hash function NaSHA is a new algorithm proposed for SHA-3. It follows the wide-pipe structure and compression function adopts quasigroup transformations. These properties of operation in quasigroup raise obstacles to analysis. However, The high probability difference to cause inner collision can be found in the quasigroup transformations. We propose a collision attack to NaSHA-512 with the complexity is 2^{192}, which is lower than the complexity of birthday attack to NaSHA-512. Using the similar method, we can find free-start collision on all versions with negligible complexity.},
		+	}

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
    author    = {Ivica Nikolić and Dmitry Khovratovich},
    title     = {Free-start attacks on NaSHA},
-   url        = {},
+   url       = {http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/3/33/Free-start_attacks_on_Nasha.pdf},
    howpublished = {Available online},
    year      = {2008},