SHA-1 - Revision history

Fmendel: /* Preimage Attacks */

2008-11-10T09:34:44Z

‎Preimage Attacks

2008-03-25T19:16:09Z

‎Collision Attacks

2008-03-25T16:10:39Z

2008-03-25T16:09:06Z

2008-03-11T10:21:32Z

‎Collision Attacks

2008-03-11T10:20:01Z

‎Collision Attacks

2008-03-11T10:19:44Z

‎Collision Attacks

2008-03-11T08:50:25Z

‎Others

2008-03-11T07:30:14Z

2008-03-11T07:29:16Z

‎Specification

@@ Line 119: / Line 119: @@
 === Preimage Attacks ===
-* We are not aware of any articles w.r.t. preimage attacks on SHA-1.
 ----

@@ Line 71: / Line 71: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
+<bibtex>
 <bibtex>
 @inproceedings{eurocryptBihamCJCLJ05,

@@ Line 69: / Line 69: @@
    isbn      = {3-540-49475-8},
    abstract  = {The most efficient collision attacks on members of the SHA family presented so far all use complex characteristics which were manually constructed by Wang et al. In this report, we describe a method to search for characteristics in an automatic way. This is particularly useful for multi-block attacks, and as a proof of concept, we give a two-block collision for 64-step SHA-1 based on a new characteristic. The highest number of steps for which a SHA-1 collision was published so far was 58. We also give a unified view on the expected work factor of a collision search and the needed degrees of freedom for the search, which facilitates optimization.},
+}
 </bibtex>
@@ Line 176: / Line 142: @@
 in all published work to date. We point out that it is more accurate
 to consider probabilities instead of conditions.},
+}
 </bibtex>

@@ Line 143: / Line 143: @@
 === Others ===
 <bibtex>
 @inproceedings{fseMendelPRR06a,
@@ Line 163: / Line 178: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
 <bibtex>
 @inproceedings{iswSatoh05,
@@ Line 180: / Line 194: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
 ----

@@ Line 103: / Line 103: @@
    isbn      = {3-540-33108-5},
    abstract  = {SHA-1 uses a single set of rotation constants within the compression function. However, most other members of the MD4 family of hash functions use multiple sets of rotation constants, i.e. the rotation amounts change with the step being processed. To our knowledge, no design rationales on the choice of rotation constants are given on any of these hash functions. This is the first paper that analyzes rotations in iterated hash functions. We focus on SHA-1-like hash functions and use recent developments in the analysis of these hash functions to evaluate the security implications of using multiple sets of rotation constants in the compression function instead of a single set. Additionally, we give some observations on the set of constants used in SHA-0 and SHA-1.},
+}
 </bibtex>
@@ Line 115: / Line 132: @@
    publisher = {Springer},
    series    = {LNCS},
    abstract  = {We report on the experiments we performed in order to assess the security of SHA-1 against the attack by Chabaud and Joux [5]. We present some ideas for optimizations of the attack and some properties of the message expansion routine. Finally, we show that for a reduced version of SHA-1, with 53 rounds instead of 80, it is possible to find collisions in less than 2^80 operations.},
    url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b105222}}

@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 === Collision Attacks ===
 <bibtex>
 @inproceedings{fseSugitaKPI07,
@@ Line 38: / Line 55: @@
+}
 </bibtex>
 <bibtex>
 @inproceedings{asiacryptCanniereR06,

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:50, 11 March 2008
Line 102:		Line 102:

	=== Others ===		=== Others ===
		+	<bibtex>
		+	@inproceedings{fseMendelPRR06a,
		+	author = {Florian Mendel and Norbert Pramstaller and Christian Rechberger and Vincent Rijmen},
		+	title = {The Impact of Carries on the Complexity of Collision Attacks on SHA-1},
		+	pages = {278-292},
		+	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11799313_18},
		+	booktitle = {FSE},
		+	publisher = {Springer},
		+	series = {LNCS},
		+	volume = {4047},
		+	year = {2006},
		+	isbn = {3-540-36597-4},
		+	abstract = {In this article we present a detailed analysis of
		+	the impact of carries on the estimation of the attack complexity
		+	for SHA-1. We build up on existing estimates and refine them. We
		+	show that the attack complexity is slightly lower than estimated
		+	in all published work to date. We point out that it is more accurate
		+	to consider probabilities instead of conditions.},
		+	}
		+	</bibtex>

	<bibtex>		<bibtex>

@@ Line 4: / Line 4: @@
 * max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits
 * compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable
-* [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf  Specification: FIPS 180-2 Secure Hash Standard]
+* Specification: [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf FIPS 180-2 Secure Hash Standard]
 == Cryptanalysis ==