

Some observations on Tangle

Yaser Esmaili Salehani
yaser.esmaeili@gmail.com

1. Introduction

Tangle is a hash function proposed by Alvarez, McGuire and Zamora [AMZ08] at the NIST Hash Competition3. No attack or weakness has been reported so far. In this paper, we give some observations on Tangle which can be utilized in the future.

2. Some observations on Tangle

We do not bring Tangle description and use the same notations and symbols as mentioned in [AMZ08].

Notations: $X(i,j) = X_j^i$ [e.g. $M(i,127) = M_{127}^i$]

Assumption: Let $M'(i,127) - M(i,127) = M(i,119) - M'(i,119) = \Delta$ or $M'(i,127) + M'(i,119) = M(i,127) + M(i,119) = \Delta'$

With considering the Generator Seeding (GS) process and the above assumption, we investigate two chaining variables (e.g. X' and X) (also the middle variables) as following:

$$j=0; g_1 = g_1, \dots, g_6 = g_6, X'(0,0) = X(0,0),$$

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$$j=7; g_1 = g_1, \dots, g_5 = g_5, g_6 = M(i,103) + M(i,111) + M'(i,119) + M'(i,127) = g_6, \\ X'(0,7) = FR_1(g_1 + g_2 + g_3) + FR_2(g_4 + g_5 + g_6) = X(0,7)$$

So, all of $X'(0,j) = X(0,j)$ ($j=0,1,\dots,7$).

In the next step, we consider the Iteration and Extraction (I&E) and Round Function (RF) processes together and apply them on the previous variables as following:

Note: Let $R=72$ if Tangle-224.

$k=1$ to $R/2$ ($=36$) and $r=0$ to $R-1$ ($=71$)

(I&E) $k=1$; $X'(1,0) = X(1,0), \dots, X'(1,7) = X(1,7), t=0, W'_1 = W_1, \dots, W'_3 = W_3$

(RF) $r=0$; $C'=C, s'=s, p'=p, q'=q; A'=A, B'=B, h'_0=h_0, h'_{16}=h_{16}$; $r=1$; $C'=C, s'=s, p'=p, q'=q; A'=A, B'=B, h'_1=h_1, h'_{17}=h_{17}$.

(I&E) $k=2$; $X'(2,0) = X(2,0), \dots, X'(2,7) = X(2,7), t=4, W'_4 = W_4, \dots, W'_7 = W_7$

(RF) $r=2$; $C'=C, s'=s, p'=p, q'=q; A'=A, B'=B, h'_2=h_2, h'_{18}=h_{18}$; $r=3$; $C'=C, s'=s, p'=p, q'=q; A'=A, B'=B, h'_3=h_3, h'_{18}=h_{18}$.

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(I&E) $k=30$; $X'(30,0) = X(30,0), \dots, X'(30,7) = X(30,7), t=116, W'_{116} = W_{116}, \dots, W'_{119} = F_2(X'(30,6), X'(30,7), K_{119}) + M'(i,119) = W_{119} - \Delta$.

(RF) **r=58**; $C' = W'_{116} + W'_{117} = C$, $s'=s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; $A'=A$, $B'=B$, $h'_0=h_0$, $h'_{16}=h_{16}$;
r=59; $C' = W'_{118} + W'_{119} = C - \Delta$, $s' = s \oplus \text{Sbox}(C' \oplus (C' \gg 8) \oplus (C' \gg 16) \oplus (C' \gg 24))$
it can be showed that $s'=s$ by choosing the appropriate $(-\Delta)$ (e.g. let $-\Delta = \Delta_3 \Delta_2 \Delta_1 \Delta_0$,
and $\Delta_0 = \Delta_1 = 0$, $\Delta_3 = \Delta_2 = 0x80$.), then, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; $A'=A$,
 $B' = F_2(h_q, h_3, FR_2(h_{p+16})) + W'_{119} = B - \Delta$, $h'_{27} = h_{27} + B' = h_{27} - \Delta$,
 $h'_{11} = h_{11} \oplus (A+B') = h_{11} \oplus (A+B-\Delta)$.

(I&E) **k=31**; $X'(31,0) = X(31,0)$, ... , $X'(31,7) = X(31,7)$, $t=120$, $W'_{120} = W_{120}$, ... ,
 $W'_{123} = W_{123}$.

(RF) **r=60**; $C' = C$, $s'=s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; here, some conditions might be risen: for
example: if $p' = p = 11$, then $h'_{11} \neq h_{11}$ and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$ and finally,
 $A' = F_1(h_p, h_{28}, FR_1(h_{q+16})) + W'_{120} + K_{s'} \neq (?) A$, $B' = F_1(h_q, h_4, FR_2(h_{p+16})) + W'_{121} \neq$
 $(?) B$, otherwise: $h'_{28} = (?) h_{28}$, $h'_{12} = (?) h_{12}$;
r=61; $C' = C$, $s'=s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; similar to the previous explanations, if again
 $p' = p = 11$ and/or 12 , then $h'_{11} \neq h_{11}$ and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$, also it is possible that $h'_{12} \neq$
 h_{12} and/or $h'_{28} \neq h_{28}$, then $A' \neq (?) A$, $B' \neq (?) B$, otherwise: $h'_{29} = (?) h_{29}$, $h'_{13} = (?) h_{13}$.

(I&E) **k=32**; $X'(32,0) = X(32,0)$, ... , $X'(32,7) = X(32,7)$, $t=124$, $W'_{124} = W_{124}$, ... ,
 $W'_{127} = F_2(X'(32,6), X'(32,7), K_{127}) + M'(i,127) = W_{127} + \Delta$.

(RF) **r=62**; $C' = C$, $s'=s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; similar to the previous section, if $p' = p = 11$
and/or 12 and/or 13 , then $h'_{11} \neq h_{11}$ and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$, also it is possible that $h'_{12} \neq$
 h_{12} and/or $h'_{28} \neq h_{28}$, $h'_{13} \neq h_{13}$ and/or $h'_{29} \neq h_{29}$ then $A' \neq (?) A$, $B' \neq (?) B$, otherwise:
 $h'_{30} = (?) h_{30}$, $h'_{14} = (?) h_{14}$;

r=63; $C' = W'_{126} + W'_{127} = C + \Delta$, $s' = s \oplus \text{Sbox}(C' \oplus (C' \gg 8) \oplus (C' \gg 16) \oplus (C' \gg 24))$,
again, it can be showed that $s'=s$ by choosing the appropriate (Δ) (e.g. let $\Delta =$
 $\Delta_3 \Delta_2 \Delta_1 \Delta_0$, and $\Delta_0 = \Delta_1 = 0$, $\Delta_3 = \Delta_2 = 0x80$ or the other options.), then, $p'=p$, $q'=q$;
similar to the previous section, if $p' = p = 11$ and/or 12 and/or 13 and/or 14 , then $h'_{11} \neq$
 h_{11} and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$, also it is possible that $h'_{12} \neq h_{12}$ and/or $h'_{28} \neq h_{28}$, $h'_{13} \neq h_{13}$
and/or $h'_{29} \neq h_{29}$, $h'_{14} \neq h_{14}$ and/or $h'_{30} \neq h_{30}$ then $A' \neq (?) A$, $B' \neq (?) B$, otherwise:
 $h'_{31} = (?) h_{31}$, $h'_{15} = (?) h_{15}$.

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(I&E) **k=36**; $X'(36,0) = X(36,0)$, ... , $X'(36,7) = X(36,7)$, $t=140$, $W'_{141} = W_{141}$, ... ,
 $W'_{144} = W_{144}$.

(RF) **r=70**; $C' = C$, $s'=s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; similar to the previous section, if $p' = p = 11$
and/or 12 ... and/or 21 , then $h'_{11} \neq h_{11}$ and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$, also it is possible that $h'_{12} \neq$
 h_{12} and/or $h'_{28} \neq h_{28}$, ... , $h'_{21} \neq h_{21}$ and/or $h'_6 \neq h_6$ then $A' \neq (?) A$, $B' \neq (?) B$,
otherwise: $h'_6 = (?) h_6$, $h'_{22} = (?) h_{22}$;

r=71; $C' = C$, $s' = s$, $p'=p$, $q'=q$; similar to the previous section, if $p' = p = 11$ and/or 12
... and/or 22 , then $h'_{11} \neq h_{11}$ and/or $h'_{11+16} \neq h_{11+16}$, also it is possible that $h'_{12} \neq h_{12}$
and/or $h'_{28} \neq h_{28}$, ... , $h'_{22} \neq h_{22}$ and/or $h'_7 \neq h_7$ then $A' \neq (?) A$, $B' \neq (?) B$, otherwise:
 $h'_7 = (?) h_7$, $h'_{23} = (?) h_{23}$.

Although the output hash values are depended on the first seven words of h_i
($i=0,1,\dots,6$), it is clear that some output words do not change at all such as: h_8 , h_9 ,
 h_{10} , h_{24} , h_{25} , h_{26} .

Obviously, we can not say that a direct attack has been proposed, but an attack might
be found to exploit this weakness. In future, we will give more details our
observations.

Also, it can be continued for the upper rounds of Tangle (e.g. for $R=80$ (Tangle-256)).

3. References

[AMZ08] Rafael Alvarez, Gary McGuire and Antonio Zamora, "The Tangle Hash Function", Submission to NIST, 2008. <http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/Tangle>.